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Abstract 
People experience a threat to their moral self-concept in the face of discrepancies between their 
moral values and their unethical behavior. We theorize that people’s need to restore their view of 
themselves as moral activates thoughts of a high-density personal social network. Such thoughts 
also lead people to be more likely to engage in further unethical behavior. In five experiments, 
participants reflected on their past unethical behavior, and then completed a task designed to 
measure network density. Those who cheated more frequently in the past, recalled their negative 
moral identity, or decided to lie were more likely to activate a high-density network (Experiment 
1-3). Using a mediation-by-moderation approach (Experiment 4), we confirm that this link 
between dishonesty and network density is explained by a threat to positive self-concept. 
Importantly, activating a dense network after engaging in dishonest behavior allows further 
dishonest behavior in a subsequent task (Experiment 5).   
 
Keywords: social network structure; network density; dishonesty; ethics; self-affirmation 
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Thick as Thieves? Dishonest Behavior and Egocentric Social Networks 
 Beyond its obvious financial consequences, dishonest behavior, when detected, can 
trigger distrust and negative emotions, and is therefore costly for social and romantic 
relationships (McCornack & Levine, 1990; Miller, Mongeau, & Sleight, 1986). Previous 
research has found that dishonest behavior can even have negative consequences when it goes 
unnoticed. Given the widespread need to view oneself as honest (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008) 
and maintain a moral self-image (Monin & Jordan, 2009), ethically questionable behavior can 
create significant discomfort, as it highlights the discrepancies between one’s moral self-concept 
and actual behavior (E. Aronson, 1968; 1969; Higgins, 1987). As a result, individuals may 
experience reduced self-esteem or moral emotions such as guilt or shame after engaging in 
dishonest behavior (Klass, 1978).  
 To reduce the discomfort of violating moral norms, people become motivated to seek out 
opportunities to salvage their moral self-concept. They may alleviate a sense of threat to their 
moral self-concept by relaxing their moral norms through moral disengagement and moral 
forgetting (Bandura, 1990; Shu & Gino, 2012; Shu, Gino, & Bazerman, 2011). Motivated to 
normalize their deceptive behavior in an effort to protect their moral self-concept (Sagarin, L 
Rhoads, & Cialdini, 1998), liars also tend to perceive the recipient of their lies as less honest than 
they would otherwise. Alternatively, they may seek moral redemption by complying with 
requests to help others (Carlsmith & Gross, 1969; McMillen, 1971; McMillen & Austin, 1971) 
or engaging in other types of prosocial and ethical behavior (Cialdini, Darby, & Vincent, 1973; J. 
Jordan, Mullen, & Murnighan, 2011).  
 The common finding in this body of research that dishonest behavior poses a threat to 
one’s moral self-concept and triggers protective and compensatory behavior raises the possibility 
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that one’s dishonest behavior may activate thoughts of a densely structured social network as a 
way of restoring positive self-concept. In sociology, the traditional conception of community as 
spatially defined has shifted to the consideration of relationally defined communities and the 
networks built around the self (Chua, Madej, & Wellman, 2011). The concept of the ego network, 
or “personal community,” has become increasingly important. Among the various networks that 
can be built around oneself, a high-density network of tightly connected “alter egos” provides 
several psychological benefits for ego protection. Network density, an indicator of the extent to 
which a network is closely knit, is theorized to enhance group cohesion and intra-group bonds 
(Barnes, 1969; Blau, 1977) and to facilitate communication and knowledge transfer across social 
network (Reagans & McEvily, 2003). Due to these characteristics, high-density networks help 
establish shared norms and trusting relationships (Coleman, 1988), and reduce loneliness 
(Stokes, 1985). In addition, being part of cohesive network improves emotional adjustment. For 
example, education research has shown that students who belong to cohesive groups tend to 
experience less anxiety and performance stress than those who do not (Bowers, Weaver, & 
Morgan, 1996; M. E. Shaw & Shaw, 1962). In the aftermath of dishonest behavior, individuals 
may think about those closest to them to restore their threatened self-concept.  
 If a high-density network buffers a threat to one’s moral self-concept, then would this 
lead to further dishonest behavior in a subsequent task? It could be argued that a high-density 
network contributes to perpetuating one’s dishonest behavior. For example, a dense network 
could lead to rapid dissemination of unethical behavior (Brass, Butterfield, & Skaggs, 1998). In 
fact, under performance pressure, close-knit networks fueled unethical practices among medical 
professionals, and trust among individuals in such networks functioned as a medium to conceal 
unethical practices (Türker & Altuntaş, 2014). Just as dishonest behavior increases distrust 
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toward the deceived (Sagarin et al., 1998), a dense and cohesive network may also be conducive 
to inter-group biases (Labianca, Brass, & Gray, 1998), thus providing further group-based 
justifications for unethical behavior. Indeed, in one study, belonging to a cohesive group helped 
in-group members rationalize their prejudice against out-group members (Effron & Knowles, 
2015). 
 Drawing from a theory that frames unethical behavior as a primarily social phenomenon 
(Brass et al., 1998), we explore the consequences of unethical behavior in cognitive activation of 
the egocentric social network. We hypothesize that thinking about or directly engaging in 
dishonest behavior would activate a high-density network, measured as the extent to which 
network members identified by participants know one another. We also propose that self-
affirmation will buffer the unintended effects of unethical behavior on the activation of high-
density networks by sustaining a person’s sense of moral adequacy (Steele, 1988). Lastly, we test 
whether triggering thoughts of a high-density network as a response to one’s dishonest behavior 
has positive or negative consequences for subsequent moral behavior. 
 We tested our main hypotheses in five experiments. Together, our findings provide novel 
empirical evidence that dishonest behavior leads to the cognitive activation of a dense social 
network as a defensive response to a threat to one’s moral self-concept. They also show that 
triggering a high-density network as a response to one’s dishonest behavior has negative 
consequences in subsequent moral behavior. 
Experiment 1: Cheaters Activate a High-density Network 
In this study, we test our hypothesis that individuals who report having cheated or lied 
more frequently will be more likely to activate a high-density network. A high-density network 
is measured by the extent to which the network members identified by participants know one 
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another. We first asked participants to rate the frequency of their own unethical behavior and 
then to report on their social networks.  
Method 
  Participants. One hundred ninety-eight individuals (Mage=23.02, SDage=4.07; 51% male) 
from the Boston/Cambridge area participated in this study as part of a laboratory study that 
aimed to recruit approximately 200-250 participants. Participants completed a 15-minute survey 
that was part of a one-hour long series of experiments they completed at individual computer 
terminals. They received $20 for completing the study and were debriefed shortly after they 
finished the survey.   
Frequency of ethically questionable behavior. We asked participants how frequently 
they have engaged in particular ethically questionable behaviors (Barkan, 2007; adapted from 
Gino, Norton, & Ariely, 2010). The 13-item scale included statement such as “be in the express 
line with too many groceries,” and lying “Sorry I am late, traffic was terrible” (from 1=never to 
5=all of the time, and 6=not applicable; See Appendix A for the full description of the scale 
items). We coded the items to which participants responded “not applicable” as missing and 
created a summary variable based on items for which participants provided responses between 1 
and 5 (α=0.85).   
Cognitive activation of network. To measure individuals’ social networks and social 
capital, sociologists have examined individuals’ core discussion network (Burt, 1984; Marsden, 
1987; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Brashears, 2009; Small, Deeds Pamphile, & McMahan, 
2015), typically using the “name generator module,” which asks survey respondents to list the set 
of individuals they regularly turn to when discussing important matters. Adapting from these past 
studies, we gave participants the following instructions: “From time to time, most people discuss 
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important matters with other people. Looking back over the last six months, who are the people 
with whom you discussed matters important to you?  Please write down up to ten names using 
the initials.” Once participants write down up to ten persons’ initials in a survey programmed in 
Qualtrics.com, we presented all possible pairs of the contacts generated by the participants (up to 
45 possible pairs, if a participant generated all 10 contacts).1 Participants indicated the strength 
of relations for each pair, from 1=no relationship to 7=extremely strong relationship. We 
dichotomized this variable to indicate whether the particular pair of contacts know each other or 
not, and formed a measure of network size (a total number of contacts generated; M=8.37, 
SD=2.61). Following the procedures used in Scott (1991) to measure cognitive activation of 
network structure, network density was calculated by dividing the total number of network ties 
(i.e., network size) by the total number of possible ties (Scott, 1991). 
Demographics. We also collected demographic information, including age, gender, level 
of education (1=high school, 2=some college, 3=associate’s degree, 4=bachelor’s degree, 
5=master’s degree, 6=doctorate or professional degree), monthly household income (1=none, 
2=under $60, 3=$60-499, 4=$500-999, 5=$1,000-$1,999, 6=$2,000-2,999, 7=$3,000-3,999, 
8=$4,000-4,999, 9=$5,000-7,499, 10=$7,500-9,999, 11=over $10,000), and religiosity (from 
1=not at all religious to 5=very religious).   
Results 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the main variables and their zero-order 
correlations. Using hierarchical multiple regression analyses, we found that the self-reported 
frequency of ethically questionable behavior is positively correlated with the activation of a more 
dense network (Model 1 in Table 2). In Model 2 and 3, we show that this relationship between 
                                                                
1 The total number of possible pairs is calculated by N(N-1)/2, where N is the total number of contacts.  
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ethically questionable behavior and network density is robust after controlling for network size 
and demographics.   
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Zero-order Correlations for Experiment 1 
 
 
Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
 
Table 2 
Results of Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses for Experiment 1 
 
Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
 
Discussion 
Mean (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Ethically questionnable behavior 1.95 (0.60)
2. Network size 7.65 (2.85)  0.13
3. Network density 0.70 (0.19)  0.19** -0.34***
4. Age 23.06 (4.08) -0.10 -0.14*  0.01
5. Female 1.48 (0.50) -0.04  0.01 -0.02  0.07
6. Education 2.75 (1.28) -0.09 -0.01  0.01  0.59***  0.16*
7. Income 6.68 (3.86)  0.01 -0.02  0.06 -0.02  0.03  0.10
8. Religiosity 2.48 (1.28)  0.05  0.08 -0.02 -0.00 -0.06 -0.02 -0.03
Predictor Variables
b SE p b SE p b SE p
1 Ethically questionable behavior  0.06  0.02  .006  0.07  0.02  .000  0.07  0.02  .001
2 Network size -0.03  0.00  .000 -0.03  0.00  .000
3 Age -0.00  0.00  .90
Female -0.00  0.02  .83
Education  0.00  0.01  .77
Income  0.00  0.00  .55
Religiosity  0.00  0.01  .79
N
Overall R-squared
Overall F
Change in R-squared
Change in F
Network Density
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
192 192 192
0.04 0.17 0.17
30.47*** 0.11
7.77 19.72 5.59
0.13 0.00
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 In an initial correlational study, we found that participants who reported more frequent 
unethical behavior tended to trigger a more dense social network than those who reported less 
frequent unethical behavior.  
Experiment 2: Liars Activate a High-density Network 
In Experiment 2, we show that not only self-reported frequency of ethically questionable 
behavior but also a decision to lie in the task is positively associated with activating more dense 
networks. We first asked participants to decide whether or not to lie to earn more money in a 
game and then to report on their social networks.  
Method 
 Participants. We predetermined 160 to be the sample size to give this study adequate 
power (1–β>0.80) to detect a medium-sized effect (r=0.30). However, six participants reported 
having technical problems with the name generator and were thus removed. As a result, a total of 
154 individuals (Mage=34.05, SDage=10.72; 54% male) participated in a 15-minute online study 
through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and received $0.50 participation fees with an opportunity to 
earn additional $0.50 depending on their decision in the game.  
Procedure. We asked participants to play a game (Gneezy, 2005) which requires them to 
decide whether to lie to another participant to earn a $0.50 bonus. In this game, all participants 
were led to believe that they were paired randomly with another anonymous player (Player 2). In 
fact, all were assigned to the role of Player 1. The participants were given information about two 
possible monetary payoffs that they were told Player 2 would not be aware of: (1) Option A, 
which would give $0.50 to Player 1 and $0.00 to Player 2, and (2) Option B, which would give 
$0.00 to Player 1 and $0.50 to Player 2. They were then asked to send one of two messages to 
Player 2: a truthful message (“Option B will earn Player 2 more money than Option A”) or a lie 
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(“Option A will earn Player 2 more money than Option B”). We used this decision as a measure 
of an individual’s willingness to lie to benefit oneself.  
We then repeated the same procedure used in Experiment 1 to measure participants’ 
cognitive activation of their social networks, followed by the demographic questionnaire.  
Results  
As hypothesized, individuals who decided to lie to their counterpart (M=0.79, SD=0.27) 
activated a more dense network than did those who decided not to lie (M=0.69, SD=0.29), 
t(152)=–2.21, p=.03, CI=[–0.19, –0.01], d=–0.36. As in Experiment 1, the relationship between 
one’s decision to lie and network constraint did not change significantly after adding the network 
size and demographics variables (age and gender) as covariates, B=0.11, SE=0.04, p=.014. 
Discussion 
Along with Experiment 1 which provide self-reported data, these behavioral results 
provide additional support for our hypothesis that one’s decision to engage in unethical behavior 
predicts triggering a denser network.  
Experiment 3: Recalling a Dishonest Self Activates a High-density Network 
In Experiment 1 and 2, we show a positive correlation between one’s lack of morality 
(both self-reported and behavioral) and network density. To address the problem of reverse 
causality, in Experiment 3, we experimentally manipulated one’s moral self-concept. We test the 
hypothesis that it is the negative moral self-concept that triggers one’s high-density network, but 
not the positive moral self-concept.  
Method 
 Participants. We pre-determined 160 to be the target sample size such that this study has 
adequate power (1–β>0.80) to detect a medium-sized effect (f=0.30). We stopped data collection 
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when we had a total of 160 individuals, but excluded 17 participants who did not follow 
instructions. A total of 143 individuals (Mage=39.91, SDage=13.49; 36% male) participated in a 
20-minute online study through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and received $0.50 participation 
fees. 
Design and task. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions: 
negative moral identity, positive moral identity, and a control condition. We adapted methods 
that have been shown to influence one’s moral identity (Reed, Aquino, & Levy, 2007; Sachdeva, 
Iliev, & Medin, 2009). In the negative moral identity condition, participants received a list of 
five negative moral traits: disloyal, greedy, mean, dishonest, and selfish. In the positive moral 
identity condition, they received a list of positive moral traits: caring, generous, fair, honest, and 
kind. Participants in the control condition received a list inanimate objects: books, keys, house, 
desk, and letter. All participants were then asked to write a short story about themselves using 
the words they received. An example of the stories provided in each condition is provided in 
Table 3.  
We used the same methods as in Experiment 1 and 2 to elicit network size and density, 
followed by a demographics survey.  
 
Table 3 
Example Stories in Each Experimental Condition for Experiment 3 
Negative Moral Identity Positive Moral Identity Control 
“There was a time in my life 
when I was a selfish person, 
someone I would not want to be 
friends with now. One night after 
everyone had left, I stole a 
present from under the office 
Christmas tree that belonged to 
another employee. It was a mean 
thing to do, and showed just how 
“One of the best times of my life 
was when I found what appeared 
to be an honest man living under 
a bridge. I felt very caring 
towards him so I decided to be 
very kind by giving him a 
generous portion of my Big Mac 
sandwich I had just purchased. 
As he ate a portion of my meal 
“After a long day at work on a 
Friday, I drove to my friends 
house to drop off a book that she 
loaned me. She wasn’t home but 
told me she kept a set of her keys 
in the mailbox. I let myself in 
and dropped the book on her 
desk in the office. I grabbed a 
clean sheet of paper from the 
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greedy and self-serving I was at 
that stage of my life. It also was 
disloyal to my employer, which 
was a nonprofit that gave jobs to 
poor people. I can't believe what 
a dishonest person I was back 
then. I'm so glad that I've 
changed. I would like to return to 
the nonprofit one day and atone 
for what I did.” 
he told me I was very fair 
towards him. I sure felt good all 
day after that. I was a little 
hungry though because he ate 
more of my meal then I thought 
he would. I had to go back and 
get an additional sandwich to fill 
up my tummy. After that I felt 
much better and decided to go 
out and find some more honest 
people living under bridges that I 
could give some food to.” 
printer and wrote a short letter to 
her thanking her for letting me 
borrow the book. I locked up and 
returned the keys to the mailbox 
and drove home. It was another 
25 minute drive and by the time I 
got home I was really beat and 
just microwaved some left overs 
and then got into my pajamas and 
vegged out in front of the 
television.” 
 
Results   
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed that the effect of recalling one’s negative 
moral identity on network density was statistically significant, F(2, 137)=3.18, p=.04, ηρ²=0.04. 
Planned contrasts revealed that individuals who recalled their negative moral identity (M=0.82, 
SD=0.17) triggered a more dense network than those in the control condition (M=0.73, 
SD=0.23), t(97)=–2.16, p=.03, CI=[–0.17, –0.01], d=–0.44, and than those who recalled their 
positive moral identity (M=0.73, SD=0.20), t(90)=–2.31, p=.02, CI=[–0.17, –0.01], d=–0.49.  
Discussion 
Incidentally recalling one’s negative moral identity triggered a high-density social 
network, while recalling one’s positive moral identity did not, since participants in that condition 
had network densities that were no different than the control condition. This finding suggests that 
the relationship between one’s moral identity and cognitive activation of social network is 
specific to negative moral identity, which poses a threat to one’s positive self-concept.    
Experiment 4: Self-affirmation Buffers a Threat to Moral Self-concept 
 In Experiment 4, we test whether a threat to one’s positive self-concept explains the 
relationship between cheating and high-density network using a mediation-through-moderation 
approach (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005). We manipulated both cheating (whether participants 
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likely engaged in it or not) and self-affirmation. We predicted that self-affirmation would 
moderate the relationship between cheating and network density. Since self-affirmation could 
reduce one’s negative feelings associated with a threat to positive self-concept by sustaining a 
person’s sense of moral adequacy (Steele, 1988), we expected that participants who are affirmed 
would not trigger high-density networks only in the likely-cheating condition and that those who 
are not affirmed would trigger high-density networks. On the other hand, self-affirmation is not 
expected to reduce network density among participants in the no-cheating condition, as their self-
concept has not been threatened by engaging in dishonest behavior.  
Method 
Participants. We targeted recruiting 160 participants who passed the attention check at 
the beginning of the survey, such that the study has 80% power to detect an effect with a 
medium-sized effect (f2=0.15). One hundred sixty individuals (Mage=33.15, SDage=10.98; 58% 
male) participated in a 20-minute online survey through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and 
received $0.50 as well as a bonus payment of up to $0.90 based on their outcomes on a series of 
short tasks.  
Procedure. Participants first read that they would be playing an online game and that 
they would receive a bonus payment based on the outcome of the game. We randomly assigned 
participants into one of four conditions in a 2 (likely cheating [Opaque] vs. no cheating 
[Transparent] X 2 (self-affirmation vs. no self-affirmation) between-subjects design 
Self-affirmation manipulation. For the manipulation of self-affirmation vs. no self-
affirmation, we gave participants a list of nine personal values and characteristics that people 
may consider to be important to them (Cohen, Aronson, & Steele, 2000). Participants in the self-
affirmation condition were told to choose one or two values that they consider most important to 
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them, write a paragraph about why this value(s) is important to them personally, and give an 
example of a time when the value(s) was particularly important in their lives. Participants in the 
no-affirmation condition were told to choose one or two values from the list that they considered 
to be least important to them and to write about why these values might be important to someone 
else.   
Cheating manipulation. For the manipulation of likely-cheating vs. no-cheating, we 
used a die-throwing game adapted from Jiang (2013), in which participants throw a virtual online 
six-sided die 10 times to earn points that could be converted into real bonus payments. Using a 
picture of a virtual die, we reminded participants that the pairs of numbers on opposite sides of 
the die must add up to seven. In each round, the number of points that participants scored 
depended on the throw of the die (randomly ranging from 1 to 6), and on the side (either the 
Upside [U] or the Downside [D]) that they had chosen before each throw. The visible side of the 
die, facing up, was called “U,” and the opposite side, facing down, was called “D.” If a 
participant chose “D” and rolled a five, then she would earn two points for that throw, whereas if 
she chose “U,” she would receive five points (See Appendix C for the example provided to 
participants). Each point was translated into three cents, and participants could receive up to 
$0.90 after five rounds.   
Participants in the opaque condition were asked to choose a side of the die (“U” or “D”) 
in their minds prior to each throw. In each round, after throwing the virtual die, they were asked 
to indicate the side they had chosen before making the throw to determine their points. Because 
participants in this condition could change their minds and chose the side that corresponds to the 
maximum points, this experimental condition allowed cheating. By contrast, participants in the 
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transparent condition were asked to choose a side of the die and report it before each throw, so 
they were not able to change their minds later.  
Dependent measure. As in Experiment 1-3, we then used the name generator and 
demographic questionnaire.  
Results  
As a manipulation check, we tested whether individuals in the likely-cheating condition 
reported higher numbers than those in the no-cheating condition by potentially engaging in 
dishonest behavior. Indeed, those in the likely-cheating condition (M=$0.65, SD=0.10) earned 
significantly more than those in the no-cheating condition (M=$0.54, SD=0.10), t(173)=–6.75, 
p<.001, CI=[–0.14, –0.07], d=–1.04.  
Using a multiple regression model, we found a significant main effect of being tempted 
to cheat versus no cheating on network density, B=0.09, SE=0.04, p=.02, and a marginally 
significant interaction between cheating and self-affirmation, B= –0.10, SE=0.05, p=.06. A 
simple slope analysis supports our mediation hypothesis (see Figure 1). When participants were 
not affirmed with core values, giving them an opportunity to cheat (likely-cheating) predicted 
activating more dense network, B=0.14, SE=0.06, p=.02. On the other hand, when participants 
were affirmed with core values, this no longer significantly predicted the activation of more 
dense networks, B=0.04, SE=0.03, p=.15.  
Figure 1. Network density across conditions, Experiment 4 
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Discussion 
 Using a mediation-through-moderation approach, we found that a threat to one’s positive 
self-concept explains the relationship between cheating and high-density network 
Experiment 5: The Role of High-Density Networks in Perpetuating Dishonest Behavior 
  In Experiment 5, we tested whether triggering a high-density network as a result of 
dishonest behavior allows individuals to engage in further dishonest behavior. This study used 
four supposedly unrelated tasks: the virtual die-throwing game from Experiment 4 as a cheating 
manipulation (Jiang, 2013), a name-generator task as in Experiment 1-4, a four-minute filler 
task, and the puzzle Boggle to measure dishonesty in the subsequent task (adapted from Marsh & 
Bower, 1993). We predicted that triggering a high-density network as a response to being in the 
likely-cheating condition would predict more subsequent dishonesty and that density would not 
predict subsequent dishonesty in the no-cheating condition.  
Method 
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Participants and task. Similar to Experiment 4, we planned to recruit 160 individuals 
and stopped data collection when we had a total of 160 individuals (Mage=35.42, SDage=10.88; 
64% male). They participated in a 25-minute online survey through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
and received $0.40 as well as a bonus payment of up to $2.20 based on the outcomes of a series 
of short tasks (a maximum of $1.20 from the die-throwing game and a maximum of $1.00 from 
the Boggle task).  
Subsequent dishonest behavior. We instructed participants to find as many four-letter 
words as they could from a letter matrix (see Figure 2 for an example) and told them that they 
would be paid $0.10 for each correctly identified word. We also asked participants to follow 
three rules when constructing their four-letter English words: (1) do not re-use letters in the 
matrix, (2) all letters must be adjacent, and (3) no proper names allowed. To help participants 
count the number of correctly identified words, we encouraged them to write down the words 
they found on a piece of paper. They were given 60 seconds to solve the matrix. They then 
reported how many they had solved and wrote down the actual words on a separate page for 
verification. We counted the number of illegitimate words that participants reported that violated 
the rules of the game: words consisting of more or less than four letters, words that could not be 
created using our three specified rules, and words that cannot be found in an English dictionary.  
Figure 2. Example of nine-letter matrix and depiction of the rules, Experiment 5.  
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Results 
Similar to Experiment 4, our manipulation check confirmed that those in the likely-
cheating condition (M=$0.62, SD=0.10) earned significantly more than those in the no-cheating 
condition (M=$0.54, SD=0.10), t(160)= –4.86, p<.001, CI=[–0.11, –0.05], d= –0.77. 
Replicating the results in Experiment 4, individuals in the likely-cheating condition (M=0.74, 
SD=0.21) triggered a more dense network than those in the no-cheating condition (M=0.68, 
SD=0.17), t(158)=–2.00, p=.047, CI=[–0.12, –0.00], d= –0.32. However, they did not differ 
significantly in the number of illegitimate words, t(158)= –0.60, p=.55, CI=[–0.59, 0.31], d=–
0.10.  
Using a negative binomial regression model to account for over-dispersion of the count 
variable, we found a significant interaction between cheating and self-affirmation, B=2.95, 
SE=1.42, p=.038 (see Figure 3 for an illustration of the interaction). As predicted, network 
density predicted more rule-breaking in the Boggle puzzle for participants in the likely-cheating 
condition, B=2.40, SE=1.00, p=.016. For those in the no-cheating condition, however, network 
density did not predict rule breaking, B= –0.55, SE=1.02, p=.59. This interaction remained 
robust even when accounting for the likely amount of cheating in the die-rolling task, B=3.09, 
SE=1.46, p=.034.  
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about a high-density network to which they belong after behaving dishonestly. Our findings 
advance the literature on the role of self-concept embedded in social contexts in ethical behavior 
(Monin & Jordan, 2009). Just as a threat to self-concept in one domain (e.g., being a sucker) 
triggers moralization of one’s behavior as a means of ego-protection (A. H. Jordan & Monin, 
2008), our results show that a threat to moral self-concept can make a high-density social 
network readily available.    
 Our research complicates the idea that morality emerges from social integration and 
cohesion, which in turn produces cultural expectations and moral practices that promote virtuous 
behavior (Durkheim, 1912). It is possible that network density could provide an opportunity for 
moral self-regulation of future behavior. That is, dense and cohesive networks may constrain 
one’s unethical behavior in the future, due to a high level of surveillance and monitoring within 
the network, and heightened risk of reputational loss when dishonesty is detected (Brass et al., 
1998; Burt & Knez, 1995). However, our findings shed new light on the opposite effect: how 
one’s initial dishonest behavior can create a vicious cycle of future dishonesty by triggering a 
high-density network as a coping mechanism to reduce a threat to one’s moral self-concept. 
Although recalling a dense network alone did not increase the future dishonest act, it predicted 
more rule-breaking when the cause of triggering a dense network is related to the discomfort 
experienced as a result of initial cheating. Although having a cohesive social network can 
regulate one’s moral behavior through shared norms (Coleman, 1988; Schafer, 2014), our work 
demonstrates that people often construct their own egocentric social network as a way to defend 
themselves from threatening information. 
 In sum, the research shows how one’s perceived social relationships are central to 
regulating human morality. At a speculative level, our research raises the possibility that a threat 
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to moral self-concept triggered by dishonest behavior may play a role in people’s social 
motivation to belong to a cohesive network, which may further perpetuate their dishonest 
behavior in the future.  
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Appendix A.  
Scale to measure the frequency of ethically questionable behavior (Experiment 1).  
Q1. How frequently do you engage in the following behaviors? (1 = “never”, 5 = “all of the 
time, 6 = “not applicable”) 
• Taking home office supplies from work. 
• Boarding a plane before your number is called. 
• Lying to an insurance company about the value of goods that were damaged. 
• Telling your supervisor that progress has been made on a project when none has been 
made at all. 
• Inflating your business expense report. 
• Buying a garment, wearing it, and returning it. 
• Being in the express line with too many groceries. 
Q2. How frequently do you say the following lies? (1 = “never”, 5 = “all of the time, 6 = “not 
applicable”) 
• Yes, John was with me last night. 
• It was good meeting you. Let’s have lunch sometime.  
• Sure, I will start working on that tonight. 
• My GPA is 4.0. 
• I thought I already sent that email out. I am sure I did. 
• Sorry I am late, traffic was terrible.  
 
   
Appendix B.  
Self-affirmation manipulation (Experiment 4).  
Q1. Please choose 2-3 values that are most [least] important to you. Although several of the 
values might be [not] important to you, please only select 2-3 values.  
 
• Being intelligent 
• Being civic-minded 
• Being creative 
• Relationships with friends 
• Relationships with family 
• Being independent 
• Being honest 
• Being healthy 
• Being kind 
• Being unique 
• Sense of humor 
• Being religious 
• Living in the moment 
• Being good-looking 
• Being athletic 
 
Q2. You have chosen the following values as most important to you. Please think about 
times when these values were important to you, and describe in a few sentences why your 
selected values were important to you.   
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